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Abstract This paper suggests that a grammar of the secret forms a concept in
Agamben’s work, a gap that grounds the enigma of sovereignty. Between the Indo-
European *krei, *se, and *per themes, the secret is etymologically linked to the
logics of separation and potentiality that together enable the pliant and emergent
structure of sovereignty. Sovereignty’s logic of separation meets the logic of rela-
tion in the form of abandonment: the point at which division has exhausted itself
and reaches an indivisible element, bare life, the exception separated from the form
of life and captured in a separate sphere. The arcanum imperii of sovereignty and
the cipher of bare life are held together in the relation of the ban as the twin secrets
of biopower, maintained by the potentiality of law that works itself as a concealed,
inscrutable force. But the ‘real’ secret of sovereignty, I suggest, is its dialectical
reversibility, the point at which the concept of the secret is met by its own immanent
unworking by the critic and scribe under the *krei theme, and subject to aban-
donment through the work of profanation; here, different species of the secret are
thrown against one another, one order undoing the other. The secret founded upon
the sacred is displaced by Agamben’s critical orientation toward the immanent:
what is immanent is both potential and hiddenness.
Keywords Agamben  Dialectic  Kant  Marx  Potentiality  Secret 
Sovereignty
In his editorial ‘Secret Accomplices: On Security and Terror’ which appeared in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung shortly after 9/11, Giorgio Agamben suggests that
‘politics is secretly working on the production of emergencies’ (Agamben 2001).
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If adjectives are important indicators to the structure of sovereignty in Agamben’s
work, we might ask what ‘secret’ complicities link security with terror to work as
accomplices within such a structure. To investigate the work of an obscure modifier in
Agamben’s philosophy is not to remain at the level of language (where, to read
Agamben, we must begin) but to invite a complex, ontopolitical inquiry about the
foundational ground of closed systems: to ask, in short, how ‘language is the
sovereign’, and how the machine can be jammed (Agamben 1998, p. 21). During a
period that has given rise to secret detentions, interrogations, and raids on Al-Qaeda,
under which the Bush Administration invoked the state secrets privilege to strike down
dissent and immunise itself against charges of criminality, and where a network of
secret prisons outside the US called ‘black sites’ exist to detain and torture those
deemed enemy combatants in the name of state security, the question of the
concealment under which sovereignty hides to legitimate itself—and of the ‘secrets’ it
keeps—is deeply resonant (Danner 2009, p. 69). Agamben’s Homo Sacer series and
related texts, which suggest that sovereignty presupposes a ‘mystery [arcano]’, are of
particular interest not just for the metaphysical implications of the term, but also given
the political history of secret operations—from disappearances to renditions—built
into the componentry of the twentieth and twenty-first century modern state and its
disciplinary apparatuses, and heightened in the aftermath of 9/11. From Mussolini’s
secret Organization for Vigilance and Repression of Anti-Fascism (OVRA) that
targeted Antonio Gramsci, to the Nazi secret police who admonished prisoners that
‘none of you will be left to bear witness’ (Agamben 2002, p. 157), to the French
Organisation de l’Arme´e Secre`te (OAS) formed to combat Algerian terrorism
(Agamben 2001), to the spectacular atrocities of the secret police in Timisoara,
Romania (Agamben 2000, p. 81), to the recent case against ‘the Tarnac nine’ in
November 2008 in France, where student activists linked to the post-situationist
‘Invisible Committee’ were accused of being terrorists (Comite´ Invisible 2007;
Agamben 2008b), the effects of this structure’s ‘secret’, which draws security and
terror into its dialectical concept, are widespread. Government, in Agamben’s
analysis, in looking for terrorism ends up constructing it itself, as the operations of
state secrecy continue to erode (and co-opt) the fiction of ‘privacy’, and capture life in a
political landscape increasingly indistinguishable from a biopolitical one. In rushing
toward a final, exceptional state form at the end of the twentieth century, Agamben
suggests that something like a supranational police state has arisen, where ‘the secret
services’ have become ‘the model itself of real political organization and real political
action’ (2000, p. 86). As testament to the immediate relevance of these concerns, the
Obama administration—which has put forth a rhetoric of ‘transparency’—is at the
moment I write in the process of making decisions over precisely what secret
information involving terror suspects during the Bush Administration can and should
be released; but where the Associated Press reported on 2 March 2009 that with the
release of secret memos, Obama has thrown ‘open the curtain on years of Bush-era
secrets’, the future of this promise remains dubious, as Obama’s policies waffle and the
Senate blocks Guantanamo’s closure.
In the wake of these spectacular examples from contemporary politics, this essay
reflects on the theoretical purchase of Agamben’s language of secrecy itself to argue
that for Agamben, the secret grounds the problem of exceptional states and enables
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the thinking of politics and ontology at a conceptual border where Agamben’s
theories of language and law come together. Scholars have variously remarked, at
times critically, that at key moments Agamben’s prose becomes enigmatic.1 In part,
this aesthetic can be attributed to Agamben’s indebtedness to Walter Benjamin
(along with the language philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein)
and linked to a messianic conception of temporality and history, coupled with a
politics of pure means that remains open to a community that has not yet been
thought. I read Agamben’s language of secrecy less as an obscurant than an
experiment in form indistinct from content: a rhetorical and political performative
that enables Agamben’s metaphysical and juridical critique by presenting an enigma
about sovereignty’s arcano—and the ‘troublemaker’ who repeatedly disrupts it—as
a provocation that calls philosophy to task, much like Benjamin’s ‘enigmatic’
allusion to a ‘real’ state of exception in his eighth thesis, and Agamben’s recondite
and revealing response to it in Homo Sacer (1998, pp. 54–62). While Agamben’s
writings do not hold the terms in rigorous distinction from one another, we might
read the arcanum of sovereignty as the non-secret, the mystery that is no mystery,
the obscurant, (what hides or occludes), as what sustains the fiction of such a
mystery, and the enigma as what transmits a forgotten reference. In this sense, the
secret is political, the occlusion hermeneutic, and the enigma aesthetic and
epistemic. Such a lexicon comprises Agamben’s ‘grammar’ of the secret—a
synonymical structure that constellates a nexus of words such as hidden, illegible,
inscrutable, and concealed along with even more numinous-sounding terms such as
cipher, arcanum imperii, mystery and enigma. This language, however, is neither
merely tropological play nor a retreat into mysticism, but a compass pointing toward
the hidden structures of sovereignty and the means of their profanation in law and
language. Coupled with a fragmented prose style that often seems to stop short, this
grammar is not only a diagnostic of sovereignty’s onto-political secret but a guide,
in the form of a riddle, beyond law’s empty nihilism toward a community without
secrets, a form that performs its own method. While Agamben’s work is
underpinned by a dense tradition of Western philosophy and Judeo-Christian
messianic thought, here, I can only begin to allude to its complex landscape and
inter-articulations as I do something quite modest: open the grammatical construct
of the secret.
Secret as Separation and Tie
The first two texts of the Homo Sacer series begin by posing different versions
of an incomplete suggestion, one that gestures toward a hidden dimension of the
political—the paradox of sovereignty—without explicitly revealing it or
1 For a sustained critique of this aesthetic, see LaCapra (2007); see also Laurent Dubreuil’s critique of
Agamben’s biopolitics as ‘philology for show’ (2006). But for a different view about the importance of
the ‘enigma’ in Agamben, see the introduction to a recent collection on Agamben by Clemens et al.
(2008).
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explicating its workings.2 Homo Sacer calls for a study of the ‘tie’ that ‘secretly
governs’ bare life and politics; the ‘only reflection’, it warns, that will bring ‘the
political out of its concealment, and … return thought to its practical calling’
(1998, p. 5). The introduction to State of Exception is equally obscure, proposing
that an ‘understanding of the very stakes’ at issue in the relation between the
law and the living being is contingent upon the lifting of the ‘veil’ covering
exceptionality’s ambiguous zone (2005a, p. 2). Marxist critiques of the state,
Agamben argues, have failed to theorise the problem of arcanum imperii, or
state secrecy, and this, he writes, ‘is the reef on which the revolutions of our
century have been shipwrecked’ where ‘one ends up identifying with an enemy
whose structure one does not understand’ (1998, p. 12). Also shored up are
humanitarian politics which, Agamben notes, ‘can only grasp human life in the
figure of bare or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret
solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight’ (1998, p. 133). The secret, in
its boundless ubiquity, becomes so visible that it is no longer seen: that is, as
Maurice Blanchot points out in his writing on disaster, it ‘disappears’ as secret
(1995, p. 137). The hint that something ‘secret’ in its very normalisation blocks
our understanding of the workings of Western political philosophy and
immobilises politics as they slide dangerously toward states of exception not
only arouses our theoretical curiosity but, as Agamben’s philosophy suggests,
invites a hermeneutical process of reading and reflection on this structure that
enables the conditions for thinking sovereignty’s potentiality and actuality, its
empty propositions and instantiations in law. While Agamben’s philosophy has
an unclear relationship to a Levinasian-styled ethics, the suggestion of a ‘secret
tie’ binding life and law issues an ethical injunction to thought: the sense that
philosophy has a ‘historical responsibility’ (what Agamben calls a modality of
‘exigency’) to think what is secret about these workings that allows for the
continuation of modern political disaster, namely, the separation and capture of
language’s unspoken, the exception abandoned in discourse (2005, pp. 40, 39).
Sovereignty’s secret is an invocation to attend to the immemorial: not to
‘remember’ and ‘commemorate’ the lost, but to allow for the transmission of the
unforgettable by exposing its very abandonment, in order to ‘remain faithful to
that which having perpetually been forgotten, must remain unforgettable’ (2005,
p. 40). The secret, like Benjamin’s dialectical image, flashes up in a moment of
danger in a state of exception, at a tipping point where the threat is oblivion of
the forgotten and the eternal return of an ontopolitical bind. Failure to respond,
in Agamben’s words, will result in a ‘return of the repressed’ that ‘will reappear
within us in a destructive and perverse way’ (2005, p. 41). To cite an (overused)
example, one thinks of the instantiation of the ‘camp’ in Guantanamo Bay. To
overturn this bind, the secret addresses the labour of cognition, the ‘stern and
resolute openness’ of philosophical thought to expose Western metaphysics’s
‘unworking’ from the standpoint of the negative ground of the as not (1999,
2 The Homo Sacer series, published anachronistically, so far includes I. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power
and Bare Life (1998), II.1 State of Exception (2003), II.2 Il Regno e la gloria: Per una genealogia
teologica dell’economia e del governo (untranslated), II.3 Il Sacramento del linguaggio: Archeologia del
giuramento (untranslated) III. Remnants of Auschwitz (2002).
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p. 106).3 As Agamben puts it, the philosophical element is ‘something which
remains unsaid within the work but which demands to be unfolded and worked
out’ (2008a, p. 9). The grammar of the secret comprises a syntax without an
understanding of which, Agamben suggests, politics and language (and for
Agamben, ontology, or first philosophy) will remain in concealment, frozen in an
unprofanable sphere. Despite the language of veiling, what is secret is not to be
uncovered or revealed; it is, to use Agamben’s articulation, to be profaned. The
secret is the cipher of power: denoting privation or withholding, it is neither
absent nor present. It appears as a difficulty or contradiction in language, a
stubborn spot or intractable problem where we experience language’s limits: the
gag in representation that calls thinking to task for the coming politics. What
critics have called Agamben’s enigmatic aesthetic may be an exercise in the
transmission of the very gap that makes the secret unavailable to language as
such in Western metaphysics.
To articulate this structure, I begin with a philological inquiry into the linguistic
and political ‘mystery of separation’ which grounds sovereignty’s secret, the means
through which the law maintains itself as an inscrutable force, what Agamben calls
the condition of law’s ‘imperfect’ Nihilism (1999, p. 171).4 Throughout his work,
Agamben plays with the etymological tie between the words secret and separate in
their verbal, adjectival and nominal forms to provide the structural foundation for
his juridical critique. The law in a sense may depend on secrets: dating back to
antiquity, the law has used strategies of separation on the one hand and indivisibility
on the other to govern populations: the principles of divide et impera in the first case
and dignitas non est partibilis in the second (Coke 1671, pp. 35–36). The term
‘secret’, (the Italian segreto), what is kept from knowledge or observation, hidden,
or concealed, derives from the past participle of the Latin secernere, to separate or
set aside, from se- apart and cernere- to distinguish or to sift. The Indo-European
root *krei, to sieve, discriminate or distinguish, is the stem that links secret with
separate.5 The word secret is said to have originated from the process of sifting
grain, whose purpose was ‘to separate the edible from the nonedible, the good from
the bad’ (Perrot et al. 1990, p. 163). The secret then evokes at once the process of
separation, the element that has been separated, and the decision on the separation.
This three-part structure enables a suggestive reading of the link between secret and
separate in the puzzle Agamben presents about the ontology of sovereignty. The
‘secret tie’ to which Agamben alludes that binds law and bare life in a zone of
indistinction operates in language through its stem *krei (and *per, through the
3 The standpoint of the ‘as not’ works within the law to disable it through a praxis of pure means: as
Agamben describes it in The Time that Remains, for example, ‘in the as not, the juridical-factical
condition is taken up again and is transposed while remaining juridically unchanged to a zone that is
neither factual nor juridical, but is subtracted from the law and remains as a place of pure praxis, of
simple ‘‘use’’ […]’ (2005b, p. 28). See also Agamben (2004a).
4 See The Open (2004b, p. 92), where Agamben writes: ‘… the solution of the mysterium coniunctionis
by which the human has been produced passes through an unprecedented inquiry into the practico-
political mystery of separation’.
5 Appendix 1: Indo-European Roots, The American Heritage Dictionary, 4th edn. (2006, p. 2034). See
also Emile Benveniste’s Indo-European language and society (1969).
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secret’s metonymical link with privation as it connects to impotentiality, the ‘secret’
of potentiality) to separate and divide life and make a ‘decision’ on it, structuring
‘the relation of the exception’ (1999, pp. 245, 179, 181). *Krei is also the root for
other terms that enter into syntactical relation in Agamben’s concept to describe
both the structure of sovereignty and the means and figures that work to disable it:
among them are riddle, decision, secretary/scribe, criminal, judgment, critic, and
hypocrite (to critique from ‘below’ or under). In taking account of this list one
thinks not only of the ‘riddle’ of sovereignty, the Schmittian ‘decision’, and Kantian
‘judgment’, but also Agamben’s exemplar troublemaker, the scrivener Bartleby,
who, in the moment he does not write, displays what Agamben calls ‘perfect’
potentiality (through ‘privation’) (1999, p. 247).
In addition to *krei and *per, another Indo-European theme works to build
Agamben’s architecture of the secret, one that Agamben remarks upon explicitly: *se
(*swe). The word secret (along with the English secern: to separate, distinguish, or
secrete), while rooted in *krei is also a derivative of *se, a stem pertaining to division
and the focus of Agamben’s discussion in Potentialities of Hegel’s ‘Absolute’ and
Heidegger’s ‘Ereignis’. For Agamben, *se, which he readily admits, ‘is not something
simple’, is the Absolute at the centre of Western metaphysics, ‘the fundamental
philosophical problem itself’ (1999, pp. 117, 116). The ‘secret’ of Being’s own
‘‘‘proper’’ identity’, *se, a reflexive pronoun, is both ‘a departure from the self and a
return to the self’, an uncanny border where what is ‘most proper and habitual to man’
is that ‘to be himself he must necessarily divide himself’; for Hegel, this constitutes the
problem of dwelling in division (1999, pp. 135, 118). Agamben ultimately tries to
think the unworking of the negative ground of division and unsayability in language
implicit in Hegel and Heidegger, a topic he explores in different terms in Language
and Death and again in Potentialities, where he argues that philosophy must ‘absolve
the proper of division’, in which se, as social praxis, would in the end become
‘transparent to itself’, loosened or freed up and led back to itself (2006, pp. 93–97,
1999, pp. 137, 116). *Se is also the derivative for ‘idiot’, a term Hannah Arendt uses to
describe the rise of abstracted life in modern politics in the division between zoe¯ and
bios on which Agamben’s work builds. Following classical political theory, for
Arendt, the ‘idiot’, or idion, Greek for ‘one’s own’, is the private life confined to the
sphere of ‘idiocy’, ‘deprived life’ cast outside politics. For Arendt, this life is
abstracted from the Rights of Man and materialised by concentration camp inmates
and stateless people who find that in ‘the abstract nakedness of being human’ they are
vulnerable to the most severe danger (1968, pp. 299–300). Arendt’s theory of
abstracted life (along with the debate between Schmitt and Benjamin) is instrumental
to Agamben in forming a theory of exceptionality grounded in a sphere of ‘naked life’,
whose entry into the polis Agamben describes as the decisive event of political
modernity, held in contradistinction to Arendt’s reading of this sphere’s apolitical,
anthropological sacrality.6 Agamben returns to the concept of ‘idiot’ in The Time that
Remains through Benjamin’s reading of Dostoevsky’s Prince Mishkin who, as one
who is forgotten (the ‘secret’ to whom thought bears responsibility), delivers an
6 For a more thorough discussion of Arendt’s politics in light of Agamben’s, see Rancie`re (2004,
pp. 298–300).
286 A. E. Garrison
123
exigency to remain unforgettable. The interlocking terms secret, separate and se,
then—along with other words that derive from the *krei, *se and *per themes—enter
into a hidden play as they form a nexus in Agamben’s work, producing something like
an intricately tied Gordian knot that grounds a central concept in Agamben’s
philosophy, the very enigma on which theory must reflect—and the knot it must cut
(later figured as a ‘division of division’, or messianic caesura)—to drive a wedge
through the biopolitical machine (2005a, p. 63).7 This etymologically dense concept of
the secret in its nexus of terms routes through Agamben’s serpentine theorisation of the
divisions, separations and relations that found the fabric of Western thought and rule in
verbal, nominal and adverbial forms to describe the structure of the state of exception
and the making of bare life.
Secret as Verb and Noun
Sovereignty’s mystery of separation in Agamben’s account works foundationally as
a verb, as an act of separation: Agamben’s sense that ‘to be himself’, man ‘must
necessarily divide himself’ (1999, p. 118). As Agamben writes in The Open, for
Koje`ve’s reading of Hegel, man enters history only through ‘a field of dialectical
tensions always already cut by internal caesurae that every time separate—at least
virtually—‘‘anthropophorous’’ animality and the humanity which takes bodily form
in it’ (p. 12). The central divide that separates animal and human life, Agamben
continues, ‘passes first of all as a mobile border within living man, and without this
intimate caesura the very decision of what is human and what is not would probably
not be possible’ (p. 15). Predicated on Arendt’s opposition of ‘two lives’, the
caesura, or ‘mobile border’, marks the division between zoe¯ and bios, biological life
and politically qualified life (Rancie`re 2004, p. 299; Agamben 2004b, pp. 15–16).
The ontological dwelling in division of *se links to the caesura that divides zoe¯ from
bios and allows for the separation of bare life from its form; for political power ‘as
we know it’, Agamben writes, ‘always founds itself—in the last instance—on the
separation of a sphere of naked life from the context of the forms of life’ (2000,
p. 4). The form-of-life, or ‘absolutely immanent’ life of the community to come,
whose coherence is signified by its hyphens, as Agamben theorises it, would make
this division obsolete: ‘life that can never be separated from its form’ is a life of
‘thought’ that remains ‘without relation’, but not without division: it is not one that
has done away with separation, but through ‘negligence’ (from the *ne root, whose
other derivatives are no, nothing, and nihilism), has put separation to a new use
(1999, p. 220, 2000, p. 3, 1998, p. 60).8 The foundational separation between
7 See, for example, the language in Homo Sacer, ‘the dissolution of the ban, like the cutting of the
Gordian knot, resembles less the solution of a logical or mathematical problem than the solution of an
enigma’ (1998, p. 48). The messianic caesura, the division of division, is prefigured in ‘The Idea of
Caesura’ in Idea of Prose (1995, p. 44) and followed up in the ‘strategic’ division Agamben identifies in
Paul’s letters in The Time that Remains (2005b, pp. 46–47).
8 As Agamben uses the term in Profanations, to ‘profane’ means to put separation to a new use: ‘to open
the possibility of a special form of negligence, which ignores separation or, rather, puts it to a particular
use’ (2007, p. 75; see also p. 87).
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vegetative or animal life and human life, voice and language is also the condition of
possibility for the ‘decision’ over life, linked to *krei as I have pointed out, where,
as Foucault has shown, life is administered and ‘seized’ as politics are transformed
into biopolitics, and in Agamben’s account, the inclusion of life in law structures all
relations (2004b, p. 15, 1998, p. 26). The presupposition of this political separation
and decision is language, the condition ‘of being in language, of being named’ to
which a thing is subjected. Language’s sovereign claim separates the linguistic from
the non-linguistic, meaningful from non-meaningful speech, and in declaring there
is ‘nothing outside language’, inscribes being into law in a ‘permanent’ state of
exception (1998, p. 21).
In the foundational act of separation, then, what is separated is not detached from
the regulative character of law; rather, sovereign (Being) and bare life (being) enter
into relation: the Schmittian sovereign decision over life becomes the rule, a murky
and violent zone of relationality. Agamben writes that there are politics because
‘man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own
bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an
inclusive exclusion’ (1998, p. 8). Agamben calls the condition where Being and
being enter into relation the ‘relation of exception’ (1998, p. 18). The ‘exception’ is
‘the condition of being included through an exclusion, of being in relation to
something from which one is excluded or which one cannot fully assume’ (1998, pp.
26–27). As an exception both inside and outside the juridical order, life is captured
in a sphere in relation to, but no longer distinguishable from law: the separation of
bare life is the condition of possibility for life’s total enmeshment by politics, where
law ‘blurs at all points with life’ (2005a, p. 63). The relation of the exception is
linked, for Agamben, to Jean-Luc Nancy’s theory of ‘abandonment’, in which the
rule of law suspends itself and applies to abandoned being in no longer applying,
through its withdrawal (Nancy 1993, pp. 36–47, 44). To be abandoned for Nancy is
to be violently exposed in a conceptual and spatial limbo to the law’s ‘limitless
severity’, ‘on the threshold in which life and law, inside and outside, become
indistinguishable’ (Nancy 1993, p. 44; Agamben 1998, p. 28). As Agamben
conceives it, the sovereign structure of the ban captures life in law in a manner that
corresponds to the structure of potentiality, ‘which maintains itself in relation to
actuality precisely through its ability not to be’ (1998, p. 46, emphasis added).
Drawing from Aristotle’s theory of dynamis (potentiality) as dynamis me¯ energein
(the potentiality not to pass into actuality), potentiality is itself a ‘nothing’ grounded
in impotentiality, the potential not to do something, not to pass into actuality by
holding something in reserve, in the manner of the kithara player who ‘is a kithara
player because he can also not play the kithara’ (1999, p. 245). Again in dialogue
with Aristotle, Agamben describes impotentiality in terms of privation, ‘to deprive’,
from the Indo-European stem *per linked to private, which was classically a
synonym for secret (1998, p. 28). For the Romans, to say that something was
‘secret’ or ‘private’ was to say that it was lost or ‘deprived’—that it was being
hoarded away, kept away from public and common use (Wallace-Hadrill 1994).
From the Aristotelian ontology of privation in the Metaphysics, Agamben points out
that Aristotle draws an important distinction between privation and absence:
privation ‘still implies a reference to the being or form deprived which manifests
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itself through its lack’ (2005b, p. 102). Under Agamben’s reading of Russian
linguist Trubetzkoy’s concept of the ‘privative opposition’, when thinking two
terms in relation, one is characterised by ‘the existence of a mark’ and ‘the other by
the lack thereof’, where the unmarked term is not an absence to the marked term’s
presence, but rather, its ‘nonpresence’, which is equivalent in some manner to ‘a
zero-degree presence (meaning that presence is lacking in its absence)’ (2005b,
p. 101). Agamben’s description of impotentiality, or privation, as the ‘cardinal
secret’ of law’s potentiality, is structured like a ‘zero-degree presence’; the ‘secret’
is not an absence of potentiality, but a presence ‘lacking in its absence’, a non-
presence that is the condition of possibility for potentiality (1999, p. 245, 2005b,
p. 101). Being realises its sovereignty as absolute actuality through the ‘secret’ of
privation, by depriving or banning its own bare life, while maintaining itself in
relation to this bare life as the ‘cipher’ of sovereignty.
The life that is banned can no longer be divided; when the logic of separation
meets the logic of the exception, abandoned being is produced as a remnant, or
‘secret’; at this point in the concept, the secret reaches its nominal form. For
Foucault at the end of The History of Sexuality, the analytic point at which Agamben
begins Homo Sacer to ‘finish’ or rewrite Foucault’s project with an onto-political
theory of sovereignty, this limit case is sex: what Foucault repeatedly calls the
‘secret’ of biopolitics, ‘discovered everywhere’ as power seizes, generates and
produces it at the moment at which life enters history (1990, pp. 153–156, 159). In
Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben describes bare life—the Muselmann, the
comatose and the neomort attached to life support systems—as the ‘secret cipher’
or ‘arcanum’ of biopower (2002, p. 156). In Agamben’s account, the Nazis sought
to produce their final secret in the Muselmann, ‘a kind of absolute biopolitical
substance’ that survives while being ‘separated from every possibility of testimony’,
who were invisible because reduced as such, they would become an ‘empty space of
people … bare, unassignable and unwitnessable life’ (2002, pp. 156–157).
Likewise, the power that accords to this form of life, the arcanum imperii (the
state ‘secrecy’) that separates and abandons life as a ‘secret’ in a separate sphere
through the structure of the law’s empty potentiality, also operates as a noun under
Agamben’s grammar: the Nazis, Agamben writes, called a participant in the Final
Solution a Geheimnistrager, ‘a keeper of secrets’ (2002, p. 156). As the mechanism
of separation reaches its remnant, the form of law, also operating as a secret, is
separated from bare life and yet held in intimate relation to it: the relation of the ban
distinguishes, yet keeps united the two terms as twin secrets under Agamben’s
concept, held together in a zone of indistinction.
Secret as Adjective
At this end stage, the structure that has worked to separate life and implicate it fully
in law shifts from verb (an act of separation) to noun (bare life and form of law as
twin secrets) to adjective: the bare life that has been separated from its form and
made unavailable for free use is arrested and diverted into an ‘autonomous’,
separate sphere where the ‘exception’ (under its *kap theme, linked to another
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derivative), is ‘grasped’. These spheres are exceptional spaces ‘that power has
seized’ where life has been evacuated and reduced to its barest substance at which it
can no longer be divided (2007, p. 77). Premised on the separations in language and
the logic of relationality, it is in these concentrated spatialisations in the world of
things (that are ‘unlocatable’, and as such categorical) that life has lost its gestures
and fetishism reigns, where the ‘word—that is, the nonlatency and the revelation of
something—might become separate from what it reveals and might end up
acquiring an autonomous consistency’ (2000, p. 83). While for Agamben the
concentration camp as nomos of modernity is the exemplary sphere of sovereignty,
questions of sovereignty are inextricable from questions of political economy:
capitalism produces ready examples of sovereignty’s separation of an autonomous
sphere where language and life enter a state of mortification as merely instrumental,
a living death in the society of the spectacle. Drawing from the work of Guy
Debord, Benjamin and Marx on commodity fetishism, Agamben argues that life in
the spectacular sphere has lost its gestures along with the possibility of
communication. Capitalism (as ‘religion’) uses separation and abandonment as
the condition of possibility for use’s conversion to exchange, as objects are ‘given
over to consumption’ and ‘spectacular exhibition’ then abounding (as Marx puts it)
in ‘metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’; Agamben’s interest in
restoring the concept of ‘usage’ as a profane practice from within the realm of
exchange value in language and law speaks to his interest in this sphere’s unworking
through a praxis of pure means (Agamben 2007, p. 82; Marx 1990, p. 163;
Agamben 2004a, p. 118). Such separate/separated spheres seized by power also
include sites of consecration—such as the museum and the domain of sacrality—
that cathect aura into objects of commemoration and worship as fetishes, sealed off
from free use in sovereignty’s ‘absolutely unprofanable’ zone, unamenable to play
(2007, p. 82).
Such an autonomous fetishised sphere is exemplified for Marx, Agamben
speculates, in ‘the first great triumph of the commodity’, the 1851 Crystal Palace in
London, in a dialectic between transparency and phantasmagoria (2000, p. 75).
Agamben’s sense of the ‘mystery of separation’ that produces capital’s separate
sphere and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gives rise to the fetishism of the
commodity, an explicit site at which ‘separate’ engages with its co-derivative
‘secret’ under the *krei theme. Agamben’s Hegelian reading of Capital places the
‘secret’ of the commodity at the centre of the text: Agamben argues that without a
theory of the mystery of the commodity—‘the immaterial center’ both sensuous and
suprasensible (i.e., social), where products of labour split into use value and
exchange value—Marx’s critical investigations in Capital ‘would not have been
possible’ (2000, p. 76). Agamben’s reading of the fetishism of the commodity works
as a metaphor for the secrecy of sovereignty (specifically in the language of
‘mystery’, ‘enigma’, and ‘decipher’, linked to ‘cipher’), but it is also a metaphor for
metaphor itself as a figure in language. Agamben’s suggestion in an early text,
Stanzas, that ‘the metaphor becomes in the realm of language what the fetish is in
the realm of things’ can help us think the following analogy: if the secret is a
metaphor for the mysterium coniunctionis of sovereignty (law’s mystery of
separation that separates a sphere of naked life from the form of life), and the
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commodity is a fetishised abstraction of exchange value separated from use value,
metaphor and fetish are linked as the remnants of the principle of division. As
Agamben suggests, they point toward the ‘‘‘barrier resistant to signification’’ in
which is guarded the original enigma of every signifying act’ (1993b, p. 149). For
Marx, of course, the commodity bears the ‘enigmatic character’ of the products of
labour as soon as it assumes a social form. Labour power actualised and transformed
into the commodity takes on the form of a ‘social hieroglyphic’ that men try to
decipher, as the ‘secret of their own social product (Marx 1990, pp. 164, 167
emphasis added). In Means without End, Agamben writes: ‘The disclosure of the
commodity’s ‘‘secret’’ was the key that revealed capital’s enchanted realm to our
thought—a secret that capital always tried to hide by exposing it in full view’ (2000,
p. 75). Sovereignty also hides bare life, like the commodity, in plain view: in
Timisoara, as Agamben chillingly recounts in Means without End, the secret police
conspired to bring Auschwitz and the age of spectacle together by broadcasting on
live television the secret of bare life, tortured and exhumed on camera to simulate
genocide (and one thinks here of the now infamous photographs taken by the US
military of victims undergoing torture at Abu Ghraib) (2000, p. 81). Capital’s other
‘secret’ is that of primitive accumulation, ‘the historical process of divorcing the
producer from the means of production’ and the foundational presupposition of
capitalistic accumulation that brought about class struggle; the enigma of this
process is perhaps exemplified for Agamben in the figure of the gypsy or the refugee
(Marx 1990, p. 875). For Antonio Negri, primitive accumulation in capitalist
economy—as the foundational taking possession of land, the division between ‘the
worker and the implements of work’—is the ‘equivalent’ of the political exception
in Agamben’s work (Negri 2008, p. 98). Between the theory of the commodity and
of primitive accumulation, Marx’s concept of the secret (like Agamben’s concept of
the secret in the Homo Sacer series and beyond) is foundationally premised on the
principles of separation and abandonment, which for Marx takes the form of
commodity fetishism. The difference is that for Agamben, of course, separation
constitutes a biopolitical chasm as sovereignty’s ontological presupposition: while
the state of exception (the end stage of the mechanism of separation and the cipher
of the secret) adopts different guises under shifting modes of production, for
Agamben its conditions are stitched into the fabric of Western metaphysics as a
fundamental biopolitical fracture. While not contingent on the accumulations of
capital, they are instantiated (in a zone of indistinction between actuality and
potentiality) in exceptional states such as the state of siege in Revolutionary France
and the society of the spectacle, where life has lost its gestures and where such
‘indecipherable’ life marks the secret of sovereignty, as the commodity form
allegorises the secret of capital.
The exceptional sphere that has been separated from the rule of law is not an
isolated space of modernity, but a categorical nomos, an ‘onto-theo-logical strategy
aimed at capturing pure being in the meshes of the logos’ that encroaches on the
entire political order (2005a, p. 60). As the end stage of the entanglements that
found the ‘mystery of separation’, the state of exception is described as
sovereignty’s ‘mystical element’ or fictio, ‘a force of law without law’ in which
no articulation between outside and inside is possible and in which law seeks to
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incorporate lawlessness in a Mobius-strip like topology (2005a, p. 39). ‘Separation’,
linked through its root to ‘discernment’, requires a decision: for Carl Schmitt’s
version of sovereignty on which Agamben draws, the sovereign is he who decides
on the exception (Schmitt 1985, p. 5). But, Agamben asks, following Benjamin in
the debate he stages with Schmitt, ‘what then happens when exception and rule
become undecidable?’ The state of exception becomes permanent when the
distinction between exception and rule can no longer be maintained, where the rule
withdraws from the exception, suspending itself as pure violence that presents ‘an
enunciation without any real reference’ (2005a, p. 40). Sovereign power and the
exercise of that power are divided where the distinction between law’s norm and its
application become undecidable, where Kantian judgment’s aporia (judgment being
another term under the *krei root) comes to the fore between particular and general
(2005a, p. 39). As law becomes progressively enveloped by its exception, the
exception becomes the rule, the Schmittian machine of sovereignty can no longer
function, and politics enters a catastrophic zone of indeterminacy between anomie
(the violent state of nature) and law, where it ‘becomes impossible to distinguish
between observance and transgression of the law’ (2005b, p. 105). The condition for
the rule’s suspension is the suspension of life itself, of ‘being’ separated from its
form and ‘seized’: law itself is nothing but what it tries to capture; it is a ‘dead
letter’ without the life that nourishes it as exception (1998, p. 27).
The form of law in the state of exception, like a vampire feeding off the living,
maintains its empty nihilism as pure potentiality through privation, through the
separation and abandonment of bare life; the knot of entanglements tightens
sovereignty’s grip as this form of law is held in relation to the form of life that
dwells at its doorstep. The labyrinth of separations and privations that instantiate the
concept of the secret within the *krei/*se/*per theme becomes even more dense as
these themes enter into syntactical array with the *ne theme, whose derivatives
include not, nothing and nihilism. Here we find that the very law that separates,
suspends (or ‘deprives’) and ‘hides’ life in plain sight as a ‘secret’ in a separate
sphere is itself ‘secret’; a concealed, ‘inscrutable’, empty form of law that is ‘in
force without signifying’; a zone of indistinction in the pure relation between law
and violence (1998, p. 52). Sovereignty is paradoxical in that this condition of the
law’s pure actuality (realised through the suspension of impotentiality) ‘presupposes
nothing other than its own potentiality’, thus creating a limit at which pure
potentiality and actuality are indistinguishable, where the sovereign ‘is precisely
this zone of indistinction’ (1998, p. 47). Here, in the zone of indistinction between
potentiality and actuality, law no longer contains a fracture; only a pure relation.
Abstracted of every content and utterly lacking reference, and characterised by its
‘unformulability’, it is all the more pervasive in its force: it becomes an ‘imperfect’
Nihilism that ‘would let the Nothing subsist indefinitely in the form of a being in
force without significance’ (1998, p. 53, 2005b, p. 106). To understand this
structure, Agamben turns to Kantian law, the categorical relation to which life is
held in ‘respect’ or ‘reverential attention’: as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, the condition
in which being is abandoned to ‘an order’, a ‘compulsion to appear absolutely under
the law’; a ‘categorical judgment’ in the inherence of a predicate which dictates an
order to man, and says ‘this is that’ (1998, p. 52; Nancy 1993, pp. 44, 46). The
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freedom that can be deduced from the law is, for Kant, an ‘inscrutable faculty’; as
he continues in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, this freedom is
‘inscrutable to us … since it is not given to us in cognition’, leaving just the empty
force of law in its place; that is, as Agamben quotes Kant, ‘once the content of the
free will is eliminated, the law is the only thing left in relation to the formal element
of the free will’ (Kant 2000, p. 376, fn. 34; Agamben 1998, p. 52). The inscrutable
functions as a key term in Agamben’s concept, both as a metonym for the secret and
as it links to the theme *krei. The ‘inscrutable’ by definition ‘cannot be searched
into or found out by searching’, for it is ‘impenetrable or unfathomable to
investigation’, ‘quite unintelligible’, and ‘entirely mysterious’ (OED). In ‘Analytic
of the Sublime’, Kant uses a term in German, die Unerforschlichkeit, translated by
Paul Guyer and others as ‘inscrutability’, to describe the idea of freedom under
moral law, that which is inscrutable to the cognitive faculty (p. 156). In German,
forschen links to the practice of research: one could literally translate inscrutability
as ‘unresearchability’.9 Yet the non-self identity of the concept begets its own
unworking through a crack in its hull. Embedded in the ‘inscrutable’ is the
etymological tie to ‘research’, which recalls the primacy Kant places on the
researcher, along with the emphasis Agamben places on the critic in the stem *krei,
where ‘[T]o have a faculty’ means ‘to have a privation’ (1999, p. 179). Lodged in
the patient unworking brought about by the practice of ‘criticism’, the enigma of
thought turns back on itself to think itself, its own ‘unresearchability’ (1999, p. 251).
Secret as Troublemaker
The ‘secret’ of sovereignty then, in the form of inscrutable law, contains its own
‘critic’, working from inside the concept to disable it. Given Agamben’s Hegelian
foundations, embedded structurally in Agamben’s architecture of the secret is that
which moves against it, its own dialectical reversibility: under the *krei theme, the
‘secret’ of sovereignty that presents a ‘riddle’ to thought is met by the ‘critic’, but
also the ‘hypocrite’ and the ‘scribe’, figures, that through the derivatives ‘not’,
‘nothing’ and ‘nihilism’ under the *ne theme, suspend and render inoperative the
very inscrutable form of law that also operates within these themes under a
metaphysics of sovereignty. Agamben’s positing of ‘secret accomplices’ such as
‘security and terror’ are indices of the secret’s very non-coincidence with itself; the
fracture that is in ‘secret complicity’ with the concept and that is the condition of
possibility for its own immanent unworking. Within the structures of sovereignty
‘secretly working’ on the production of emergencies, there is another kind of secret
working: that of the ‘troublemaker’; the one, Agamben suggests in Homo Sacer,
‘who tries to force sovereign power to translate itself into actuality’ (1998, p. 47).
Agamben’s exemplar troublemaker is Bartleby, whom the narrator of Melville’s
story fittingly calls ‘the inscrutable scrivener’, an impenetrable figure who counters
the inscrutability of law through the elisions of reference in language; when
summoned, for example, Bartleby mildly asks, ‘What is wanted?’ omitting any
9 I am grateful to Gerhard Richter for pointing this out.
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reference to himself as a ‘subject’ or inhabitant of a socio-juridical identity in the
vocation to which he has been called (Melville 2007, pp. 27, 12). Bartleby, who
famously prefers ‘not to’, is a figure of contingency who possesses ‘perfect
potentiality’ in ‘the moment in which he does not write’, meeting the imperfect
potentiality or Nothing of the law—a quasi-divine hyper-Being—not only by means
of its immanent critique, but by critiquing it as a hypocritic (again tied to the *krei
theme): a Nothing from ‘below’.10 In preferring not to perform the duties given to
him, through the work of privation or impotentiality (what Agamben calls ‘pure’
potentiality), Bartleby enacts a ‘privative opposition’: a zero-degree presence
between occurrence and non-occurrence, by expressing not an absence but a non-
presence of language’s content. In so doing he enables the passivity of thought
itself, turning thought back to the potentiality to not-think, to enact ‘the thought of
thought’ (1993a, p. 37). Agamben points out that Aristotle calls this impotent
unworking that gives thought to its own intelligibility ‘agent intellect’. Bartleby,
secretly working from what Melville’s narrator repeatedly calls his ‘hermitage’, or
private dwelling to force the law to actuality, resembles a secret ‘agent intellect’ in
his private, obstinate praxis to hold the law in suspension, through what Deleuze
calls a formula of ‘secret agrammaticality’ in language (1999, p. 255). Hermited
away behind a folding screen, Bartleby frustrates his employer with a series of
‘mulish vagaries’ in which he retracts successively from the law, coiling ever
inward: he ‘prefers not to’ proof or read copy, to let the narrator into his own office,
to disclose any personal details or information about himself, to go for a walk or
leave his space, to write, to copy, or to quit the chamber once the narrator has
decided to move; all part of a patient strategy to force the law/yer to terminate him,
to translate the empty potentiality of law into actuality. Bartleby’s renunciation of
copying interrupts the eternal replications of the law that are grounded on the
abandonment of impotentiality; by forcing law’s potentiality to actuality where
nothing is left impotential, Bartleby becomes the life over which the ‘decision’ is
forced within the *krei root, taken as a ‘criminal’ to jail where he will die. But for
Agamben this is not a tragic narrative: in jamming the law by ceasing to copy it,
Bartleby has ‘disremembered’ the law in preferring not to replicate it. Through the
patient work of privation, Bartleby has forced the law to actuality, taking away what
is potential in the law and in so doing, subjecting it to the very logic of abandonment
that structures the exception and captures bare life. Following Agamben’s logic in
The Idea of Prose, in the limbo space in which Bartleby dwells, it is not God/the
‘law’ who has abandoned and forgotten him, but he who has forgotten God/the law;
in a sense he has abandoned God (p. 78). Agamben wants to recuperate Bartleby’s
death not as a tragic one, but as one who is ‘saved in being irredeemable’, in a limbo
space that carves a dwelling beyond necessity and contingency, a domain of the
‘irreparable’ or profane (1999, p. 271). This limbo nature, Agamben writes, is the
‘secret’ of Bartleby, ‘the ineradicable root of that ‘‘I would prefer not to’’ on which,
along with the divine, all human reason shatters’ (1995, p. 78).
10 See discussion of Neoplatonism’s two ‘Nothings’, one from above and one from below, in
Potentialities (1999, p. 252).
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The secret of the metaphysics of sovereignty implicated in the divine and human
reason is here met and suspended by Bartleby’s own secret gesture as limbo creature
between heaven and earth; Bartleby’s ‘secret’ is prefigured as a ‘profanation’ or
‘disremembrance’ of God in Idea of Prose, published in Italian twenty years before
Profanations, which explicitly formulates the logic of profanation. For Agamben, to
profane (the opposite of ‘to consecrate’) is to return something that was once
‘sacred’, or that has been arrested and captured in a separate sphere by the
mechanisms of sovereignty, to the realm of free use; he uses a series of figures
(contagion, negligence, play, distraction, study) to explore the unmooring of the
possibility of use from these spheres that have worked to become ‘unprofanable’
(2007, pp. 73–92). Agamben argues in previous texts that the logic of abandonment
must be pushed to an extreme in order to free it: ‘only where the experience of
abandonment is freed from every idea of law and destiny (including the Kantian
form of law and law’s being in force without significance) is abandonment truly
experienced as such’ (1998, p. 60).
Like Bartleby’s disremembrance of God from a deeply embedded sphere of law
in his hermitage in the narrator’s legal chambers, in Agamben’s essay ‘Genius’ in
Profanations, life can only bid Genius adieu, in the iconic image of Prospero telling
Ariel to go free, after one has abandoned oneself to him in the ‘secret relationship’
one maintains with him: indulgere genio (2007, p. 10). In time, Agamben is quick to
point out, we must separate from him; it is only when we ‘begin to forget about
Genius’—when we hear the distant notes of his departure along with the last
vestiges of Kantian law—that exhausted and suspended messianic time is fulfilled
(p. 18). This logic of ‘seizure’ or ‘indulgence’ and then ‘separation’, a reversal of
the abandonment enacted under sovereign law, applies not only to the secret
relationship one maintains with Genius, but to the relationship to the figure of the
secret in its more mystical connotations, as ‘magic’. In the essay ‘Magic and
Happiness’, Agamben writes that the secret (in my reading a metaphor for the secret
of sovereignty) is guarded by an evil magus who holds the secret name as ‘the seal
of his power of life and death over the creature that bears it’ (p. 22). Here, life as
bare life is ‘seized’ by the secret name to which, as if under Kantian law, ‘it can not
fail to respond’. But from within this grasp there is another tradition, in which the
secret name is not the cipher of life’s subservience to power, but what ‘sanctions its
liberation from language’: the gesture that allows a ‘separation’ or a ‘breaking free’
from the name and that ‘restores the creature to the unexpressed’ (p. 22). This may
lead us closer to what Agamben means when he writes that a society in which
profanation is practiced is not one without separation, but one that has learned to put
separation to a new use, in pushing the logic of abandonment to the extreme (p. 87).
Freed of all traces of metaphysical presupposition, the ‘secret’ that meets and
dialectically reverses sovereignty’s secret is revealed as nothing more than gesture,
the sphere of pure means and the end of secrets, ‘a wholly profane mystery in which
human beings, liberating themselves from all sacredness, communicate to each
other their lack of secrets as their most proper gesture’ (p. 85). For politics,
Agamben writes, ‘is the sphere of the full, absolute gesturality of human beings, and
it has no name other than its Greek pseudonym, which is barely uttered here:
philosophy’ (p. 85). Under the name of philosophy, the labour of criticism is an
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immanent dynamic that forms a mediation with the secret and separate to show the
point of reversibility at the fault line of the concept. It allows us to contemplate
politics in relation to language in the political exigencies of our moment as we are
addressed by the secret’s injunction to the immemorial, from the office of the Dead
Letter, and beyond.
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